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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?

Author

Listed:
  • Martin G. Kocher

    (CREED, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Peter Martinsson

    (Göteborg University, Sweden)

  • Martine Visser

    (Göteborg University, Sweden)

Abstract
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin G. Kocher & Peter Martinsson & Martine Visser, 2006. "Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-104/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060104
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    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/06104.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiment; public goods; punishment; stake size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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