Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions
In: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
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- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Economics and Finance;JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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