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Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating? Evidence from committee assignments

Author

Listed:
  • Amanda B. Chittom
  • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda B. Chittom & Franklin G. Mixon Jr., 2003. "Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating? Evidence from committee assignments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 161-175, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:161-175
    DOI: 10.1007/s101010200057
    as

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s101010200057
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin G. Mixon & Amanda C. Pagels, 2007. "Are Congressional Black Caucus Members More Reliable? Loyalty Screening and Committee Assignments of Newly Elected Legislators," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 413-431, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: Cartels; public choice; political loyalty; congressional committees; JEL classification:D71; D72; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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