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The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge

Author

Listed:
  • Xavier Lambin
  • Joachim Schleich
  • Corinne Faure
Abstract
We revisit the issue of the energy efficiency (EE) gap by explicitly acknowledging the two-sided nature of the rental housing market and two-sided asymmetries of information between tenants and landlords. Employing a theoretical matching model, we show that Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) that signal a dwelling’s energy performance induce optimal EE investments by landlords only if tenants pay their energy expenditures in full. When landlords pay part of the energy expenditures, they seek tenants who will conserve energy. Our model shows that asymmetry of information over tenant characteristics results in suboptimally low investments in EE. This may even render EPCs counterproductive. As a remedy, we show that tenant-side signaling needs to be rolled out jointly with EPCs and may even be sufficient when contracts include energy expenditures. Data from an original survey provides support for these insights and suggests that information on the tenants’ side contributes to more EE investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Lambin & Joachim Schleich & Corinne Faure, 2023. "The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(1), pages 75-92, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:44:y:2023:i:1:p:75-92
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.1.xlam
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2013. "Pricing and investments in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    2. Anne Ray & Ruoniu Wang & Diep Nguyen & Jim Martinez & Nicholas Taylor & Jennison Kipp Searcy, 2019. "Household Energy Costs and the Housing Choice Voucher Program: Do Utility Allowances Pay the Bills?," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(4), pages 607-626, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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