[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v27y1989i2p179-96.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Welfare Costs of Rationing by Waiting

Author

Listed:
  • Deacon, Robert T
  • Sonstelie, Jon
Abstract
With price controls and rationing by waiting, rational consumers increase the quantity bought per purchase. This individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss. This cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls, i.e., the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself. This point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls. Rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent transferred. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Deacon, Robert T & Sonstelie, Jon, 1989. "The Welfare Costs of Rationing by Waiting," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 179-196, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:2:p:179-96
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. LaPlue, Lawrence D., 2022. "Environmental consequences of natural gas wellhead pricing deregulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    2. Fleck, Robert K., 2014. "Can prohibitions on “price gouging” reduce deadweight losses?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 100-107.
    3. Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "The Parking Lot Problem," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-119, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
      • Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "The Parking Lot Problem," Working Papers 2007-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Rik Chakraborti & Gavin Roberts, 2023. "How price-gouging regulation undermined COVID-19 mitigation: county-level evidence of unintended consequences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 51-83, July.
    5. Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2003. "The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1027-1046, September.
    6. Besley, Timothy & Hall, John & Preston, Ian, 1999. "The demand for private health insurance: do waiting lists matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 155-181, May.
    7. Mireia Jofre-Bonet, 2000. "Public health care and private insurance demand: The waiting time as a link," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 51-71, January.
    8. Edward L. Glaeser, 1996. "The Social Costs of Rent Control Revisted," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1747, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    9. Parry, Ian W.H., 2001. "On the Efficiency of Public and Private Health Care Systems: An Application to Alternative Health Policies in the United Kingdom," Discussion Papers 10822, Resources for the Future.
    10. Elsa Marques & Sian Noble & Ashley W. Blom & William Hollingworth, 2014. "Disclosing Total Waiting Times For Joint Replacement: Evidence From The English Nhs Using Linked Hes Data," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 806-820, July.
    11. Luttmer Erzo F.P., 2007. "Does the Minimum Wage Cause Inefficient Rationing?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-42, October.
    12. Van Ommeren, Jos N. & Van der Vlist, Arno J., 2016. "Households' willingness to pay for public housing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 91-105.
    13. Aart Gerritsen, 2016. "How Many Harberger Triangles Does it Take to Fill one Okun Gap?," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2016-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    14. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. & DeAngelo, Gregory J., 2012. "Goods allocation by queuing and the occurrence of violence: A probabilistic analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 1-7.
    15. Akbar Marvasti, 2006. "A Contingent Valuation of Customer Delay in Medical Services," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 31-45, Winter.
    16. Lui, Hon-Kwong & Suen, Wing, 2011. "The effects of public housing on internal mobility in Hong Kong," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 15-29, March.
    17. Franz Hubert, 1993. "The Impact of Rent Control on Rents in the Free Sector," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 30(1), pages 51-61, February.
    18. Rik Chakraborti & Gavin Roberts, 2020. "Anti-Gouging Laws, Shortages, and COVID-19: Insights from Consumer Searches," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    19. Debra Moore Patterson, 1996. "Reform in Eastern Europe: A General Equilibrium Model with Distortions in Relative Prices and Factor Markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 457-472, May.
    20. Gerritsen, Aart, 2017. "Equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 56-68.
    21. R. Chakraborti & G. Roberts, 2021. "Learning to Hoard: The Effects of Preexisting and Surprise Price-Gouging Regulation During the COVID-19 Pandemic," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 507-529, December.
    22. Buschena, David E. & Anderson, Terry L. & Leonard, Jerry L., 2001. "Valuing Non-Marketed Goods: The Case of Elk Permit Lotteries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 33-43, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:2:p:179-96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.