Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?
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- Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008.
"Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty,"
Working Papers in Public Economics
115, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
- Enrico MARCHETTI & Giuseppe CICCARONE, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," EcoMod2008 23800083, EcoMod.
- Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2003. "Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 521-540, September.
- Meixing Dai & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2010.
"Accountability And Transparency About Central Bank Preferences For Model Robustness,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 212-237, May.
- Meixing Dai & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2009. "Accountability and Transparency about Central Bank Preferences for Model Robustness," Working Papers of BETA 2009-18, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Dai, Meixing & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2012. "Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2371-2381.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Can inflation contract discipline central bankers when agents are learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
- Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2006. "The Walsh Contracts for Central Bankers Are Optimal After All!," Working papers 2006-14, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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