The Value of Equitable Redemption in Commercial Mortgage Contracting
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DOI: 10.1007/s11146-007-9064-4
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Cited by:
- Bruce Gordon & Daniel Winkler, 2015. "Statutory Right of Redemption and the Selling Price of Foreclosed Houses," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 365-397, October.
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Keywords
Equitable redemption; Commercial mortgage contracting; Clogging;All these keywords.
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