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Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas A. Curott
  • Tyler Watts
  • Benjamin R. Thrasher
Abstract
This paper investigates the six textbooks most commonly adopted in U.S. undergraduate money and banking courses for how they describe the influences that commercial banks and central banks have on macroeconomic stability. We examine seven topics: (1) the inherent stability of banks, bank runs, and panics; (2) The historical origins of central banks created before the Fed; (3) the fragility of U.S. banks during the National Banking Era and the origins of the Federal Reserve System; (4) U.S. bank panics during the Great Depression; (5) deposit insurance; (6) monetary policy and the Great Recession of 2008–2009 ; and (7) the performance of the U.S. economy before and after the Federal Reserve Act. For each of these topics we review the academic literature and compare this literature to the information presented in college textbooks. In each case we find the textbook presentations are incomplete in a way that systematically favors one view in the literature over another, making a government-cheerleading bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas A. Curott & Tyler Watts & Benjamin R. Thrasher, 2020. "Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 17(1), pages 1-98–151, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:17:y:2020:i:1:p:98-151
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    money and banking; textbooks; bank runs; contagion; bank panic; deposit insurance; National Banking Era; Great Depression; Financial Crisis of 2008;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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