[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pacfin/v34y2015icp253-272.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can Islamic banking ever become Islamic?

Author

Listed:
  • Azmat, Saad
  • Skully, Michael
  • Brown, Kym
Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the dominance of asset side debt contracts in Islamic banks, even though many consider alternative Islamic joint venture (IJV) contracts to be the ideal Islamic financing mode. Theoretical models based on asymmetric information are used to argue that adverse selection and moral hazard alone cannot explain this phenomenon. The model is augmented with risk averse depositors to show that the emergence of asset side IJV could be deterred by Islamic banks' liability side. This paper suggests that for IJV, affiliated venture capital and private equity might prove more successful institutions than banking.

Suggested Citation

  • Azmat, Saad & Skully, Michael & Brown, Kym, 2015. "Can Islamic banking ever become Islamic?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 253-272.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:34:y:2015:i:c:p:253-272
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.03.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X15000359
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.03.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 345-363, June.
    3. Ahmad, Ausaf & Khan, Tariqullah & Iqbal, Munawar, 1998. "Challenges Facing Islamic Banking (Occasional paper)," Occasional Papers 80, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
    4. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2001. "Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring," NBER Working Papers 8202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    6. Asli Demirguk-Kunt & Thorsten Beck & Ouarda Merrouche, 2013. "Islamic Banking versus Conventional Banking: Business model, Efficiency, and Stability," Post-Print hal-01638080, HAL.
    7. Gompers, Paul A, 1995. "Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-1489, December.
    8. Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring.
    9. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:2:p:601-621 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Khan, Feisal, 2010. "How 'Islamic' is Islamic Banking?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 805-820, December.
    11. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    12. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    13. Christopher B. Barry, 1994. "New Directions in Research on Venture Capital Finance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), Fall.
    14. Beck, Thorsten & Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Merrouche, Ouarda, 2013. "Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 433-447.
    15. Habib Ahmed, 2002. "Incentive-compatible profit-sharing contracts: a theoretical treatment," Chapters, in: Munawar Iqbal & David T. Llewellyn (ed.), Islamic Banking and Finance, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    17. Munawar Iqbal & David T. Llewellyn (ed.), 2002. "Islamic Banking and Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2499.
    18. Bharath, Sreedhar & Dahiya, Sandeep & Saunders, Anthony & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 368-419, August.
    19. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    20. Ahmed, Habib, 2005. "Operational Structure for Islamic Equity Finance - Lessons from Venture Capital (Research Paper)," Occasional Papers 212, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
    21. Rahmatina A. Kasri & Salina Hj. Kassim, 2009. "Empirical Determinants of Saving in the Islamic Banks: Evidence from Indonesia المحددات التجريبية للادخار في البنوك الإسلامية: أدلة من إندونيسيا," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., vol. 22(2), pages 181-201, July.
    22. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    23. Chong, Beng Soon & Liu, Ming-Hua, 2009. "Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 125-144, January.
    24. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    25. Abdel-Fattah A.A. Khalil & Colin Rickwood & Victor Murinde, 2002. "Evidence on agency-contractual problems in mudarabah financing operations by Islamic banks," Chapters, in: Munawar Iqbal & David T. Llewellyn (ed.), Islamic Banking and Finance, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    26. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    27. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    28. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2001. "Venture Capitals As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 426-430, May.
    29. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses," Factor Markets Working Papers 123, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    2. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Finn Tarp, 2003. "Financial liberalization, financial development and economic growth in LDCs," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 189-209.
    3. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Yuliy Sannikov, 2012. "Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000384, David K. Levine.
    5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 1992. "Developing country capital structures and emerging stock markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 933, The World Bank.
    6. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    7. Nacer Bernou & Marceline Grondin, 2001. "Réconciliation entre libéralisation financière et croissance économique dans un système fondé sur la banque," Post-Print halshs-00179981, HAL.
    8. Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, 2002. "Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start‐Up Firms: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 169-197, February.
    9. Cameron, Alistair & Oak, Mandar & Shan, Yaping, 2021. "Peer monitoring and Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 337-358.
    10. N. Berger, Allen & F. Udell, Gregory, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 613-673, August.
    11. Abdul-Rahman, Aisyah & Abdul Latif, Radziah & Muda, Ruhaini & Abdullah, Muhammad Azmi, 2014. "Failure and potential of profit-loss sharing contracts: A perspective of New Institutional, Economic (NIE) Theory," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 136-151.
    12. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    13. Poitevin, Michel, 1989. "Information et marchés financiers : une revue de littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 65(4), pages 555-589, décembre.
    14. Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
    15. Tuomas Takalo & Tanja Tanayama, 2010. "Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies?," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 16-41, February.
    16. Šeho, Mirzet & Bacha, Obiyathulla Ismath & Smolo, Edib, 2020. "The effects of interest rate on Islamic bank financing instruments: Cross-country evidence from dual-banking systems," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    17. Kumru, Cagri S. & Sarntisart, Saran, 2016. "Banking for those unwilling to bank: Implications of Islamic banking systems," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-12.
    18. Azmat, Saad & Skully, Michael & Brown, Kym, 2014. "The Shariah compliance challenge in Islamic bond markets," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 47-57.
    19. Abedifar, Pejman & Hasan, Iftekhar & Tarazi, Amine, 2016. "Finance-growth nexus and dual-banking systems: Relative importance of Islamic banks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(S), pages 198-215.
    20. Tuomas Takalo & Tanja Tanayama, 2010. "Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies?," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 16-41, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Islamic banks; Moral hazard; Islamic joint venture finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:34:y:2015:i:c:p:253-272. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.