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Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions

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  • Ellison, Martin
  • Valla, Natacha
Abstract
In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents creates an additional motivation for caution in optimal monetary policy. An active policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in inflation expectations, which is detrimental to welfare. JEL Classification: D81, D83, D84, E52, E58
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Suggested Citation

  • Ellison, Martin & Valla, Natacha, 2001. "Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 153-171, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:48:y:2001:i:1:p:153-171
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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