[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v115y2020ics0094119019300518.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Centralization and regional development: Evidence from a political hierarchy reform to create cities in china

Author

Listed:
  • Bo, Shiyu
Abstract
How does centralization or decentralization in government affect regional development? This paper draws upon a quasi-natural experiment in China’s political hierarchy from the 1980s to investigate the effects of centralization in a novel sub-provincial setting. In this political hierarchy reform, China created “cities” from groups of rural counties and centralized counties’ political powers to the newly established city governments. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that centralization has positive causal effects on industrial productivity within the created cities. My analysis of industrial firm-level data reveals a reduction in the dispersion of marginal products, suggesting that centralization will help to reduce regional resource misallocation and improve aggregate productivity. A decomposition exercise shows that the gains are mainly contributed by extensive margin from entry and exit. I quantify the loss in productivity under decentralization by hypothetically reallocating inputs to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in centralization. Finally, he reform increases the concentration and specialization of production in space.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo, Shiyu, 2020. "Centralization and regional development: Evidence from a political hierarchy reform to create cities in china," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:115:y:2020:i:c:s0094119019300518
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2019.06.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119019300518
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jue.2019.06.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Federico Boffa & Amedeo Piolatto & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2011. "Political centralization and government accountability," Economics Working Papers 1335, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2015.
    2. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June.
    3. Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2010. "The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 3-30, Spring.
    4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    5. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    6. Zhangkai Huang & Lixing Li & Guangrong Ma & Lixin Colin Xu, 2017. "Hayek, Local Information, and Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2455-2478, August.
    7. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    8. Benjamin Faber, 2014. "Trade Integration, Market Size, and Industrialization: Evidence from China's National Trunk Highway System," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 1046-1070.
    9. Krugman, Paul, 1991. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 483-499, June.
    10. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October.
    11. Wang, Jin, 2013. "The economic impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 133-147.
    12. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    13. Baum-Snow, Nathaniel & Henderson, J. Vernon & Turner, Matthew A. & Zhang, Qinghua & Brandt, Loren, 2020. "Does investment in national highways help or hurt hinterland city growth?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    14. Lucia Foster & John C. Haltiwanger & C. J. Krizan, 2001. "Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: New Developments in Productivity Analysis, pages 303-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, 1995. "Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 195-227.
    16. Ellison, Glenn & Glaeser, Edward L, 1997. "Geographic Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 889-927, October.
    17. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Peter J. Klenow, 2009. "Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(4), pages 1403-1448.
    18. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
    19. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    20. Diego Restuccia & Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Heterogeneous Plants," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 707-720, October.
    21. Zheng Song & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2011. "Growing Like China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 196-233, February.
    22. Federico Boffa & Amedeo Piolatto & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2012. "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the Clean Air Act," Working Papers 2012/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    23. Yu Qin, 2017. "‘No county left behind?’ The distributional impact of high-speed rail upgrades in China," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 489-520.
    24. Federico Boffa & Amedeo Piolatto & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2016. "Political Centralization and Government Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 381-422.
    25. Dilip Mookherjee, 2015. "Political Decentralization," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 231-249, August.
    26. Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Loren Brandt & J. Vernon Henderson & Matthew A. Turner & Qinghua Zhang, 2017. "Roads, Railroads, and Decentralization of Chinese Cities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(3), pages 435-448, July.
    27. Brandt, Loren & Van Biesebroeck, Johannes & Zhang, Yifan, 2012. "Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 339-351.
    28. Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, 2004. "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 159-217, January.
    29. Henderson, Vernon & Becker, Randy, 2000. "Political Economy of City Sizes and Formation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 453-484, November.
    30. Shi, Xiangyu & Xi, Tianyang, 2018. "Race to safety: Political competition, neighborhood effects, and coal mine deaths in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 79-95.
    31. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    32. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
    33. Henderson, J. Vernon & Wang, Hyoung Gun, 2007. "Urbanization and city growth: The role of institutions," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 283-313, May.
    34. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Lu, Yang K., 2017. "Decentralization and political career concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 201-210.
    35. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    36. Bai, Chong-En & Du, Yingjuan & Tao, Zhigang & Tong, Sarah Y., 2004. "Local protectionism and regional specialization: evidence from China's industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 397-417, July.
    37. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1091-1135.
    38. Lu, Jiangyong & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Trends and determinants of China's industrial agglomeration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 167-180, March.
    39. Desmet, Klaus & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2015. "The Geography of Development Within Countries," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1457-1517, Elsevier.
    40. Davis, James C. & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2003. "Evidence on the political economy of the urbanization process," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 98-125, January.
    41. repec:dgr:kubcen:2012033 is not listed on IDEAS
    42. Poncet, Sandra, 2003. "Measuring Chinese domestic and international integration," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21.
    43. Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2014. "Firms, Misallocation, and Aggregate Productivity: A Review," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 735-770, August.
    44. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    45. Wu, Guiying Laura, 2018. "Capital misallocation in China: Financial frictions or policy distortions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 203-223.
    46. Chen, Ying & Henderson, J. Vernon & Cai, Wei, 2017. "Political favoritism in China’s capital markets and its effect on city sizes," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 69-87.
    47. Eric Bartelsman & John Haltiwanger & Stefano Scarpetta, 2013. "Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 305-334, February.
    48. Virgiliu Midrigan & Daniel Yi Xu, 2014. "Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from Plant-Level Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 422-458, February.
    49. Chen, Ting & Kung, J.K.-S., 2016. "Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 86-106.
    50. Fan, Shenggen & Li, Lixing & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2012. "Challenges of creating cities in China: Lessons from a short-lived county-to-city upgrading policy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 476-491.
    51. Chun-Chung Au & J. Vernon Henderson, 2006. "Are Chinese Cities Too Small?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 549-576.
    52. Ruixue Jia & Huihua Nie, 2017. "Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 105-118, March.
    53. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    54. Yi Lu & Jin Wang & Lianming Zhu, 2019. "Place-Based Policies, Creation, and Agglomeration Economies: Evidence from China's Economic Zone Program," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 325-360, August.
    55. Li, Pei & Lu, Yi & Wang, Jin, 2016. "Does flattening government improve economic performance? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 18-37.
    56. Cai, Hongbin & Treisman, Daniel, 2004. "State corroding federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 819-843, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Hong & Wei, Xin, 2022. "Border effects within a city and regional coordinated development in emerging economies," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    2. Shi, Xuezhu, 2022. "The health-wealth nexus for the elderly: Evidence from the booming housing market in China," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Bo, Shiyu & Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng & Wang, Boqun, 2021. "Intergovernmental communication under decentralization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 606-652.
    4. Meng‐Ting Chen & Jiakai Zhang, 2024. "Political hierarchy spillovers: Evidence from China," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 329-348, January.
    5. Yu, Binbin & Zhou, Xinru, 2023. "Urban administrative hierarchy and urban land use efficiency: Evidence from Chinese cities," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 178-195.
    6. Tan, Jing & Liu, Tianyi & Xu, Hao, 2024. "The environmental and economic consequences of environmental centralization: Evidence from China's environmental vertical management reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    7. Weiwei Xiao & Qihang Xue & Xing Yi, 2023. "Does the Belt and Road Initiative promote international innovation cooperation?," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
    8. Bo, Shiyu & Cheng, Chao, 2021. "Political hierarchy and urban primacy: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 933-946.
    9. Pang, Jindong & Shen, Shulin & Zhou, Ningzhe, 2024. "The Spillover effect of government relocations on economic growth in Chinese cities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 222(C), pages 104-122.
    10. Shi, Tie & Zhu, Wenzhang & Fu, Shihe, 2021. "Quality of life in Chinese cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    11. Shiyu Bo, 2021. "Environmental Regulations, Political Incentives and Local Economic Activities: Evidence from China," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(3), pages 812-835, June.
    12. Zuocheng Chen & Krishna P. Paudel, 2021. "Economic openness, government efficiency, and urbanization," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 1351-1372, August.
    13. Bo, Shiyu & Wu, Yiping & Zhong, Lingna, 2020. "Flattening of government hierarchies and misuse of public funds: Evidence from audit programs in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 141-151.
    14. Zhu, Jiong & Liu, Shouying & Li, Yihao, 2021. "Removing the “Hats of Poverty”: Effects of ending the national poverty county program on fiscal expenditures," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    15. Yang, Xiaohui & Yan, Ji & Tian, Kun & Yu, Zihao & Yu Li, Rebecca & Xia, Senmao, 2021. "Centralization or decentralization? the impact of different distributions of authority on China's environmental regulation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    16. Dong, Xuebing & Miao, Binbin & Chi, Ruonan, 2023. "Capital flows under integration: Evidence from China's metropolitan area development planning," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    17. Cui, Xiaomeng & Zhong, Zheng, 2024. "Climate change, cropland adjustments, and food security: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bo, Shiyu & Cheng, Chao, 2021. "Political hierarchy and urban primacy: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 933-946.
    2. Jia, Junxue & Liang, Xuan & Ma, Guangrong, 2021. "Political hierarchy and regional economic development: Evidence from a spatial discontinuity in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Lu, Yang K., 2017. "Decentralization and political career concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 201-210.
    4. Bo, Shiyu & Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng & Wang, Boqun, 2021. "Intergovernmental communication under decentralization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 606-652.
    5. Gao, Ming & Gu, Qiankun & He, Shijun, 2022. "Place-based policies, administrative hierarchy, and city growth: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    6. Zheng Li & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization and Interregional Capital Misallocation: Evidence from China," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1816, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    7. Laiqun Jin & Xiuyan Liu & Sam Hak Kan Tang, 2021. "High-Technology Zones, Misallocation of Resources among Cities and Aggregate Productivity: Evidence from China," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 21-11, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    8. Han, Yi & Wu, Mingqin, 2024. "Inter-regional barriers and economic growth: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    9. Wei Tang & Geoffrey J.D. Hewings, 2017. "Do city–county mergers in China promote local economic development?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(3), pages 439-469, July.
    10. Eberhardt, Markus & Wang, Zheng & Yu, Zhihong, 2016. "From one to many central plans: Drug advertising inspections and intra-national protectionism in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 608-622.
    11. Chen, Jidong & Shi, Xinzheng & Zhang, Ming-ang & Zhang, Sihan, 2024. "Centralization of environmental administration and air pollution: Evidence from China," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    12. Lu Ming & Zhao Chen & Yongqin Wang & Yan Zhang & Yuan Zhang & Changyuan Luo, 2013. "China’s Economic Development," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14502.
    13. Wu, Mingqin & Yu, Linhui & Zhang, Junsen, 2023. "Road expansion, allocative efficiency, and pro-competitive effect of transport infrastructure: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    14. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    15. Lu, Jiangyong & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Trends and determinants of China's industrial agglomeration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 167-180, March.
    16. Li, Lei & Luo, Changtuo, 2023. "Does administrative decentralization promote outward foreign direct investment and productivity? Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    17. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    18. Hongqi Ma & Guangjun Shen, 2021. "Do new mayors bring fresh air? Some evidence of regulatory capture in China," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 227-249, December.
    19. Markus Eberhardt & Zheng Wang & Zhihong Yu, 2013. "Intra-National Protectionism in China: Evidence from the Public Disclosure of ‘Illegal’ Drug Advertising," CSAE Working Paper Series 2013-07, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    20. Xi, Tianyang & Yao, Yang & Zhang, Muyang, 2018. "Capability and opportunism: Evidence from city officials in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1046-1061.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralization; Political hierarchy; Misallocation; City creation; Productivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • P25 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:115:y:2020:i:c:s0094119019300518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.