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Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection

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  • Williamson, Oliver E.
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  • Williamson, Oliver E., 1996. "Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 149-155, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:31:y:1996:i:2:p:149-155
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joskow, Paul L, 1991. "The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 53-83, Special I.
    2. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
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