[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v104y2002i1p89-103.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison

Author

Listed:
  • Katok, Elena
  • Sefton, Martin
  • Yavas, Abdullah
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Katok, Elena & Sefton, Martin & Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 89-103, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:104:y:2002:i:1:p:89-103
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(01)92832-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
    2. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-836, July.
    3. Glazer, Jacob & Perry, Motty, 1996. "Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 27-32, July.
    4. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    5. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 32-42, July.
    6. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "Repetition and signalling: experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 357-362, March.
    7. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
    8. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    9. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    2. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & Sally E. Sadoff, 2011. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 975-990, April.
    3. Eva M. Krockow & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman, 2015. "Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, August.
    4. García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020. "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 391-433.
    5. Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
    6. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2009. "Field Centipedes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1619-1635, September.
    7. Rampal, Jeevant, 2022. "Limited Foresight Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 166-188.
    8. Dan Levin & Luyao Zhang, 2022. "Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium," Papers 2202.12292, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    9. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
    10. Eva M. Krockow & Masanori Takezawa & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman & Samuel Smithers & Toshimasa Kita & Yo Nakawake, 2018. "Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese differences in trust and cooperation," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13(1), pages 61-72, January.
    11. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    12. Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    13. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Corchon, Luis C., 2003. "An experiment on Nash implementation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 161-193, June.
    14. Roy Chen & Yan Chen & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021. "Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 2-30, March.
    15. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
    16. Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    17. Ryan O. Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James E. Parco, 2004. "Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game," Rationality and Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 91-120, February.
    18. Briony D Pulford & Eva M Krockow & Andrew M Colman & Catherine L Lawrence, 2016. "Social Value Induction and Cooperation in the Centipede Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(3), pages 1-21, March.
    19. , J. & ,, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    20. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:104:y:2002:i:1:p:89-103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.