Welfare effects of product certification under latent adverse selection
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102826
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More about this item
Keywords
Credible certification; Welfare-reducing certification; Asymmetric information; Adverse selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
Statistics
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