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Auctions with variable supply: Uniform price versus discriminatory

Author

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  • Damianov, Damian S.
  • Becker, Johannes Gerd
Abstract
We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty, where uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity, given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case, this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates a higher expected revenue for the seller and a higher trade volume.

Suggested Citation

  • Damianov, Damian S. & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Auctions with variable supply: Uniform price versus discriminatory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 571-593, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:4:p:571-593
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    2. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Hanke, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2020. "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-014, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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    4. Mazaher Haji Bashi & Gholamreza Yousefi & Claus Leth Bak & Jayakrishnan Radhakrishna Pillai, 2016. "Long Term Expected Revenue of Wind Farms Considering the Bidding Admission Uncertainty," Energies, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-17, November.
    5. Shenghao Gao & Peyman Khezr & Armin Pourkhanali, 2024. "Uniform price auctions with pre-announced revenue targets: Evidence from China's SEOs," Papers 2410.00063, arXiv.org.
    6. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata & Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2022. "Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable allowance supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    7. Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018. "An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights," Discussion Papers Series 587, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    8. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2021. "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    9. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2010. "Trade and welfare: Does industrial organization matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 85-87, November.
    10. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    11. Khezr, Peyman & Pourkhanali, Armin, 2023. "An investigation of auctions in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," MPRA Paper 118120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Becker, Johannes Gerd & Damianov, Damian S., 2006. "On the existence of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-87, January.
    13. Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2020. "Mind your Ps and Qs! An Experiment on Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Discussion Papers Series 618, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    14. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Permit market auctions with allowance reserves," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 283-306.
    15. Hummel, Patrick, 2016. "Position auctions with dynamic resizing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 38-46.
    16. Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 60-76, January.
    17. Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2019. "Cost containment in pollution auctions," Discussion Papers Series 610, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    18. Zhuo Hu & Dong Huang & Congjun Rao & Xiaolin Xu, 2016. "Innovative allocation mechanism design of carbon emission permits in China under the background of a low-carbon economy," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 43(2), pages 419-434, March.
    19. Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2021. "An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(4), pages 571-585, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sealed bid multi-unit auctions Variable supply auctions Discriminatory and uniform price auctions Subgame perfect equilibria Rationalizable strategies;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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