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Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play

Author

Listed:
  • Naidu, Suresh
  • Hwang, Sung-Ha
  • Bowles, Samuel
Abstract
We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:1:p:31-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    7. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    9. H. Peyton Young, 1998. "Conventional Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(4), pages 773-792.
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