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Applying early decision: Student and college incentives and outcomes

Author

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  • Chapman, Gabrielle
  • Dickert-Conlin, Stacy
Abstract
Colleges’ early decision (ED) admission policies require accepted students to commit to attend the school without comparing outside options. With data from two liberal arts schools we find evidence that students with higher willingness and ability to pay and lower measured ability levels are more likely to apply ED. Applying ED raises the probability of acceptance by 40 percentage points. We address the potential selection of students into ED, including estimating an upper bound of 46 percentage points following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005). One college appears to use the ED process to screen applicants with high SAT scores and female applicants, thereby avoiding the potential adverse selection of applicants in the regular decision process. Finally, even conditional on higher socioeconomic status and other observable characteristics, applying ED is correlated with higher financial aid packages, perhaps because the college's financial aid resources are higher earlier in the admission process.

Suggested Citation

  • Chapman, Gabrielle & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2012. "Applying early decision: Student and college incentives and outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 749-763.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:31:y:2012:i:5:p:749-763
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Wei-Cheng & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2014. "Simultaneous screening and college admissions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 296-298.
    2. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2021. "Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(1), pages 66-84.
    3. Chen, Wei-Cheng & Chen, Yi-Yi & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2018. "Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 295-316.
    4. Zeky Murra-Anton, 2022. "Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 833-870, October.
    5. Annie M. Wofford, 2022. "The Perpetuation of Privilege: Exploring the Relationship Between Early Admissions and High-Impact Practices," Research in Higher Education, Springer;Association for Institutional Research, vol. 63(8), pages 1312-1342, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Early decision; College admission;

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality

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