[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v52y1984i1p21-45.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Prescott, Edward C
  • Townsend, Robert M
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:1:p:21-45
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198401%2952%3A1%3C21%3APOACEW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    2. Gordon, Donald F, 1974. "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 431-459, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Adverse Selection And Tax Externalities In A Model Of Entrepreneurial Investment," Working Papers 225812, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1608-1622.
    3. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Johannes Johnen, 2019. "Automatic‐renewal contracts with heterogeneous consumer inertia," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 765-786, November.
    5. Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2019. "A Welfare Analysis of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Prevention," TSE Working Papers 19-1035, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 22 Jan 2024.
    6. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 1998. "Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets," Working Papers 98-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    7. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
    8. Pierre Picard, 2019. "Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection When Insurers Pay Policy Dividends," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 887-914, December.
    9. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    10. Vitor Farinha Luz, 2022. "Optimal dynamic insurance contracts," Papers 2208.14560, arXiv.org.
    11. Guth, W. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Equilibrium selection in the Spence signaling game," Discussion Paper 1989-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Smart, Michael, 2000. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-169, February.
    13. Dosis, Anastasios, 2016. "Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers WP1606, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    14. Dosis, Anastasios, 2017. "Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 5-8.
    15. Chiraz FEKI, 2016. "Information asymmetry and technical efficiency: Case of a panel of Tunisian insurance companies," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(4(609), W), pages 299-314, Winter.
    16. Schob, Ronnie & Wildasin, David E., 2007. "Economic integration and labor market institutions: Worker mobility, earnings risk, and contract structure," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 141-164, March.
    17. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    18. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019. "Paid to Quit," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
    19. Gordon, Robert J, 1982. "Why U.S. Wage and Employment Behaviour Differs from That in Britain and Japan," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(365), pages 13-44, March.
    20. Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Manuelli, Rodolfo E, 1989. "Labor Contracts in a Model of Imperfect Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 358-363, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:1:p:21-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.