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Land Inequality or Productivity: What Mattered in Southern Vietnam after 1975?

Author

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  • Minh-Tam T. Bui
  • Arayah Preechametta
Abstract
Land redistribution and agricultural collective production were the key components of agrarian reforms implemented by the Vietnamese Communist Party in the south of the country after 1975. Land inequality was serious in the region under the Republic of Vietnam's regime. The new government struggled with agricultural collectivisation contributing to the decline in rice productivity. This study explains the persistence of a market-based agricultural production in the southern economy under the new political regime. Beside the economic reasons and arguments of local peasants' everyday politics cited in the literature, we argue that the de facto political power of the middle-class landowners was an important factor impeding the performance of agricultural cooperatives. It also implies that agricultural productivity was more vital than land inequality during the study period. We apply the model of Acemoglu and Robinson explaining how de facto political power helps elites to maintain their economic institutions in spite of a political change.

Suggested Citation

  • Minh-Tam T. Bui & Arayah Preechametta, 2016. "Land Inequality or Productivity: What Mattered in Southern Vietnam after 1975?," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 300-319, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:asiaps:v:3:y:2016:i:2:p:300-319
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/app5.127
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nhu Che, Tuong & Kompas, Tom & Vousden, Neil, 2001. "Incentives and static and dynamic gains from market reform: rice production in Vietnam," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1-26.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    3. Tuong Nhu Che & Tom Kompas & Neil Vousden, 2006. "Market Reform, Incentives and Economic Development in Vietnamese Rice Production," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 48(2), pages 277-301, June.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2006. "De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 325-330, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Phuc Van Phan & Martin O'Brien, 2022. "Is small beautiful? An empirical analysis of land characteristics and rural household income in Vietnam," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 66(3), pages 561-580, July.
    2. Khoa A. Trinh & Nathan Berg & Arlene Garces‐Ozanne & Stephen Knowles, 2022. "Why Did They Not Borrow? Debt‐Averse Farmers In Rural Vietnam," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 60(4), pages 228-260, December.
    3. Dinh, Hoang Huu & Wesseler, Justus, 2024. "Decentralization Of Vietnam'S forestlands: The policy process and impact," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    4. Tran, Tuyen Quang & Vu, Huong Van, 2019. "Land fragmentation and household income: First evidence from rural Vietnam," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    5. Guillaume Duteurtre & Emmanuel Pannier & Nathalie Hostiou & Mai Huong Nguyen & Jean-Daniel Cesaro & Duy Khanh Pham & Pascal Bonnet, 2022. "Economic Reforms and the Rise of Milk Mega Farms in Vietnam: Governing the Post-socialist Transition," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(4), pages 2098-2125, August.
    6. Abubakar, Ismaila Rimi, 2021. "Predictors of inequalities in land ownership among Nigerian households: Implications for sustainable development," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).

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