Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150083
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- Philippe Aghion & Matthew Jackson, 2014. "Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 20301, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
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