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The Public Cost of Unilateral Action

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  • Andrew Reeves
  • Jon C. Rogowski
Abstract
Scholarship on democratic responsiveness focuses on whether political outcomes reflect public opinion but overlooks attitudes toward how power is used to achieve those policies. We argue that public attitudes toward unilateral action lead to negative evaluations of presidents who exercise unilateral powers and policies achieved through their use. Evidence from two studies supports our argument. In three nationally representative survey experiments conducted across a range of policy domains, we find that the public reacts negatively when policies are achieved through unilateral powers instead of through legislation passed by Congress. We further show these costs are greatest among respondents who support the president's policy goals. In an observational study, we show that attitudes toward unilateral action in the abstract affect how respondents evaluate policies achieved through unilateral action by presidents from Lincoln to Obama. Our results suggest that public opinion may constrain presidents' use of unilateral powers.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Reeves & Jon C. Rogowski, 2018. "The Public Cost of Unilateral Action," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(2), pages 424-440, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:2:p:424-440
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12340
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    Cited by:

    1. Djourelova, Milena & Durante, Ruben, 2019. "Media Attention and Strategic Timing in Politics: Evidence from U.S. Presidential Executive Orders," CEPR Discussion Papers 13961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Milena Djourelova & Ruben Durante, 2019. "Media attention and strategic timing in politics: Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders," Economics Working Papers 1675, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Milena Djourelova & Ruben Durante, 2019. "Media Attention and Strategic Timing in Politics: Evidence from U.S. Presidential Executive Orders," Working Papers 1125, Barcelona School of Economics.

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