Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2015, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2018. "Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01631682, HAL.
- Yeon Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001049, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2018. "Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets," Post-Print halshs-01631682, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2013, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2019. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," Post-Print halshs-02087847, HAL.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2019. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02087847, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023.
"The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
- Josue Ortega & Thilo Klein, 2022. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Papers 2204.07255, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Akyol, Ethem, 2023. "Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022.
"The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3154-3222.
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," Post-Print halshs-03917996, HAL.
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03917996, HAL.
- Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
- Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2020. "What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Arnaud Z. Dragicevic, 2021. "Emergence and Dynamics of Short Food Supply Chains," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 31-55, March.
- Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Large matching markets; pareto efficiency; payoff equivalence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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