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CONCEALING-Gate: Optical Contactless Probing Resilient Design

Authors:

M. Tanjidur Rahman,

Nusrat Farzana Dipu,

Mark Tehranipoor,

Navid AsadizanjaniAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC), Volume 17, Issue 3

Article No.: 39, Pages 1 - 25

https://doi.org/10.1145/3446998

Published: 30 June 2021 Publication History

Abstract

Optical probing, though developed as silicon debugging tools from the chip backside, has shown its capability of extracting secret data, such as cryptographic keys and user identifications, from modern system-on-chip devices. Existing optical probing countermeasures are based on detecting any device modification attempt or abrupt change in operating conditions during asset extraction. These countermeasures usually require additional fabrication steps and cause area and power overheads. In this article, we propose a novel low-overhead design methodology to prevent optical probing. It leverages additional operational logic gates, termed as “CONCEALING-Gates,” inserted as neighbor gates of the logic gates connected to the nets carrying asset signals. The switching activity of the asset carrying logic is camouflaged with the switching activity of the concealing-gate. The input signal and placement in the layout of the concealing-gates must be selected in such a way that they remain equally effective in preventing different variants of optical probing, i.e., electro-optical frequency mapping and Electro-optical probing. The methodology is suitable for the existing ASIC/FPGA design flow and fabrication process, since designing new standard logic cells is not required. We have performed a comprehensive security evaluation of the concealing-gates using a security metric developed based on the parameters that are crucial for optical probing. The attack resiliency of the logic cells, protected by concealing-gates, is evaluated using an empirical study-based simulation methodology and experimental validation. Our analysis has shown that in the presence of concealing-gates, logic cells achieve high resiliency against optical contactless probing techniques.

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Cited By

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Parvin SGoli MTorres FDrechsler R(2023)FELOPi: A Framework for Simulation and Evaluation of Post-Layout File Against Optical Probing2023 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE)10.23919/DATE56975.2023.10137295(1-2)Online publication date: Apr-2023
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Index Terms

CONCEALING-Gate: Optical Contactless Probing Resilient Design
1. Security and privacy
  1. Security in hardware

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems

ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems Volume 17, Issue 3

July 2021

483 pages

ISSN:1550-4832

EISSN:1550-4840

DOI:10.1145/3464978

Editor:
Ramesh Karri
Polytechnic Institute of New York University, USA

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2021 Association for Computing Machinery.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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ACM Journals for the Design of Smart and Connected Systems

Publication History

Published: 30 June 2021

Accepted: 01 January 2021

Revised: 01 October 2020

Received: 01 June 2020

Published in JETC Volume 17, Issue 3

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Cited By

Parvin SAhmadi-Pour SJha CTorres FDrechsler R(2024)Lower the RISC: Designing optical-probing-attack-resistant coresMicroprocessors and Microsystems10.1016/j.micpro.2024.105121111(105121)Online publication date: Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2024.105121
Sanida TDasygenis M(2024)A novel lightweight CNN for chest X-ray-based lung disease identification on heterogeneous embedded systemApplied Intelligence10.1007/s10489-024-05420-254:6(4756-4780)Online publication date: 4-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10489-024-05420-2
Parvin SGoli MTorres FDrechsler R(2023)FELOPi: A Framework for Simulation and Evaluation of Post-Layout File Against Optical Probing2023 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE)10.23919/DATE56975.2023.10137295(1-2)Online publication date: Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE56975.2023.10137295
Rathee GKerrache CCheriguene A(2023)Blockchain-Based Mechanism for Smart Record Monitoring During and After the COVID-19 PandemicIT Professional10.1109/MITP.2023.331065025:5(20-28)Online publication date: 3-Nov-2023
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Zhang HLin LFang QAlioto M(2023)Laser Voltage Probing Attack Detection With 100% Area/Time Coverage at Above/Below the Bandgap Wavelength and Fully-Automated DesignIEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits10.1109/JSSC.2023.327459658:10(2919-2930)Online publication date: Oct-2023
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Malviya ADixit RShukla AKushwaha N(2023)Long Short-Term Memory-based Deep Learning Model for COVID-19 Detection using Coughing SoundSN Computer Science10.1007/s42979-023-01934-74:5Online publication date: 30-Jun-2023
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Zamiri Azar KMardani Kamali HFarahmandi FTehranipoor MZamiri Azar KMardani Kamali HFarahmandi FTehranipoor M(2023)Multilayer Approach to Logic LockingUnderstanding Logic Locking10.1007/978-3-031-37989-5_11(279-307)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2023
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Zamiri Azar KMardani Kamali HFarahmandi FTehranipoor MZamiri Azar KMardani Kamali HFarahmandi FTehranipoor M(2023)Emergence of Cutting-Edge Technologies on Logic LockingUnderstanding Logic Locking10.1007/978-3-031-37989-5_10(251-277)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2023
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Tehranipoor MNalla Anandakumar NFarahmandi FTehranipoor MAnandakumar NFarahmandi F(2023)Optical Probing Attack on Logic LockingHardware Security Training, Hands-on!10.1007/978-3-031-31034-8_14(259-271)Online publication date: 30-Jun-2023
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Zuzak MLiu YMcDaniel ISrivastava AMitra TYoung EXiong J(2022)A Combined Logical and Physical Attack on Logic ObfuscationProceedings of the 41st IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design10.1145/3508352.3549349(1-9)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2022
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