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research-article

Digitally Assisted Mixed-Signal Circuit Security

Published: 01 August 2022 Publication History

Abstract

The design and manufacturing steps of a chip typically involve several parties. For example, a chip may comprise several third-party intellectual property (IP) cores and the integrated circuit (IC) fabrication may be outsourced to a third-party foundry. IP cores and ICs are shared with potentially untrusted third parties and, as a result, are subject to piracy attacks. Even more, any legally purchased chip may be reverse engineered to retrieve the design down to transistor level and, thereby, it is also subject to piracy attacks. In this article, we propose <italic>MixLock</italic>, an anti-piracy countermeasure for mixed-signal IP cores and ICs. <italic>MixLock</italic> protection is based on inserting a lock mechanism into the design such that correct functionality is established only after applying a key which is the designer&#x2019;s secret. The lock mechanism acts on the mixed-signal performances by leveraging logic locking of the digital part. <italic>MixLock</italic> presents several key attributes. It is generally applicable, it is nonintrusive to the sensitive analog section, it incurs no performance penalty and has very low area and power overheads, it is fully automated, and it is capable of co-optimizing security in both the analog and digital domains. We demonstrate <italic>MixLock</italic> on a <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\Sigma \Delta $ </tex-math></inline-formula> analog-to-digital converter (ADC) using hardware measurements and an audio demonstrator.

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  • (2024)Enhancing security in QCA-based circuits using optimal key gate placementInternational Journal of Information Security10.1007/s10207-024-00842-y23:3(2395-2405)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
  • (2023)Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected SynchronizationIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.321850720:5(3845-3859)Online publication date: 31-Aug-2023

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        cover image IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
        IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems  Volume 41, Issue 8
        Aug. 2022
        396 pages

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        IEEE Press

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        Published: 01 August 2022

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        • (2024)Enhancing security in QCA-based circuits using optimal key gate placementInternational Journal of Information Security10.1007/s10207-024-00842-y23:3(2395-2405)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
        • (2023)Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected SynchronizationIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.321850720:5(3845-3859)Online publication date: 31-Aug-2023

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