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Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect. (2005). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Saitoh, Hiroki .
In: ISER Discussion Paper.
RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0646.

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule. (2006). Serizawa, Shigehiro.
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0648.

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References

References cited by this document

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  9. Klemperer, P., What really Matters in Auction Design, Journal of Economic Perspectives (2002): 169-189

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  11. MacMillan, John, Selling Spectrum Rights, Journal of Economic Perspectives (1994), 145-162
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  12. Makowski, Louise and Ostroy, Joseph, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms and Perfect Competition, Journal of Economic Theory (1987): 244-261

  13. Maskin, E., and Riley, J., Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders, Econometrica (1984) 52 (6), 1473-1518
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  14. Milgrom, Paul, Putting Auction Theory to Work, (2004) Cambridge University Press.

  15. Miyake, M., On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions, International Journal of Game Theory (1998), 27 1-19

  16. Roth, A., and Sotomayor, M., Two-sided matching (1992) In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume I, NorthHolland, Amsterdam.

  17. Roth, A., and Sotomayor, M., Two-sided matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (1990) Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University Press.

  18. Sakai, T., Second price auctions when preferences are not quasi-linear, (2005) mimeo.
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  19. Vickrey, William, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance (1961), 8-37

  20. Walker, Mark, A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences, Econometrica (1978): 147-152

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