A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Jianxin Yi and
Yong Li
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 81, issue C, 79-86
Abstract:
In this paper, we generalize Green and Laffont’s (1979) impossibility theorem to the following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent’s types is sufficiently rich, we cannot find mechanisms that allow bounded deviations from the decisive efficiency, incentive compatibility and budget-balance at the same time. Hence, it is impossible to find an incentive compatible mechanism with minimum social welfare losses. Furthermore, we discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights in a quasi-linear environment (see Sen, 1970a,b; Deb et al., 1997). Specifically, some new impossibility results are established.
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:81:y:2016:i:c:p:79-86
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.009
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