Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm ()

No 24, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.

Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions; Demand Reduction; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation (2009)
Journal Article: Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0024

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