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Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration. (2008). Shields, Timothy.
In: CIRANO Working Papers.
RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-11.

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  9. Crawford, V. P. (2003). Lying for strategic advantage: Rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions. The American Economic Review, 93(i):133-149.

  10. Dawkins, R. (2006). The God Delusion. Houghton Muffin.
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  11. Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., and Mukherji, A. (199S). An experimental study of strategic information transmission. Economic Theory, 6:389-403. Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Economic Experiments, 10(2): 171-i 78. forthcoming Experimental Economics.

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  13. Wang, J. T., Spezio, M., and Camerer, C. F. (2006). Pinocchios pupil: Using eyetracking and pupil dilation to understand truth-telling and deception in games. Technical report, UCLA Department of Economics.

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  2. Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment. (2016). Minozzi, William ; Woon, Jonathan.
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  3. Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence. (2016). Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel ; Gottardi, Piero ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Feri, Francesco ; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.
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  4. Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games. (2015). Onderstal, Sander ; Adrian de Groot Ruiz, ; Offerman, Theo.
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  6. Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. (2015). Onderstal, Sander ; de Groot Ruiz, Adrian, ; Offerman, Theo.
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  13. Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games. (2013). Shields, Timothy ; Sheremeta, Roman.
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  17. Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent. (2011). Onderstal, Sander ; Adrian de Groot Ruiz, ; Offerman, Theo.
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  20. An experimental study of blind proficiency tests in forensic science. (2011). Koppl, Roger ; Cowan, Everard .
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