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Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication. (2013). Smith, John ; Hertel, Johanna .
In: Theory and Decision.
RePEc:kap:theord:v:75:y:2013:i:2:p:267-291.

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Communication between unbiased agents. (2023). Dilme, Francesc.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:613-622.

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  2. Efficient coordination in the lab. (2019). García-Gallego, Aurora ; Rodrigo-Gonzalez, Amalia ; Hernandez-Rojas, Penelope ; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora.
    In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.
    RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:14:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11403-017-0214-3.

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References

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