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An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk. (2015). Wang, Joseph ; Lim, Wooyoung ; Lai, Ernest K..
In: Games and Economic Behavior.
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:114-144.

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Cited: 22

Citations received by this document

Cites: 43

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Cocites: 21

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Truth by Consensus: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. (2024). Garratt, Rodney ; Camera, Gabriele ; Monnet, Cyril.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:2403.

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  2. Costly verification and commitment in persuasion. (2023). Zhou, Junya.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:212:y:2023:i:c:p:1100-1142.

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  3. Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment. (2023). Montero, Maria ; Sefton, Martin ; Burdea, Valeria.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:113-149.

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  4. Competition in persuasion: An experiment. (2023). Ye, Bohan ; Wu, Wenhao.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:138:y:2023:i:c:p:72-89.

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  5. Welfare in Experimental News Markets. (2022). Vaccari, Federico ; Ploner, Matteo ; Albertazzi, Andrea.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2022.41.

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  6. Welfare in Experimental News Markets. (2022). Vaccari, Federico ; Ploner, Matteo ; Albertazzi, Andrea.
    In: FEEM Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:feemwp:329585.

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  7. Welfare in Experimental News Markets. (2021). Vaccari, Federico ; Ploner, Matteo ; Albertazzi, Andrea.
    In: SocArXiv.
    RePEc:osf:socarx:5j2w8.

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  8. Experimenting with incentives for information transmission: Quantity versus quality. (2020). Lafky, Jonathan ; Wilson, Alistair J.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:169:y:2020:i:c:p:314-331.

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  9. Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling and Efficient Coordination. (2020). Brandts, Jordi ; Cooper, David J.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:1211.

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  10. Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk. (2019). Nafziger, Julia ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:2597.

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  11. Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude. (2019). Houser, Daniel ; Wang, Siyu.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:381-395.

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  12. Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts. (2019). Harbaugh, Rick ; Chung, Wonsuk .
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:3:p:520-540.

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  13. Communication with evidence in the lab. (2018). Hagenbach, Jeanne ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:139-165.

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  14. Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games. (2017). Lu, Shih En ; En, Shih .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:177-208.

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  15. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:789.

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  16. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Papers.
    RePEc:nuf:econwp:1602.

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  17. Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment. (2016). Minozzi, William ; Woon, Jonathan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:97-114.

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  18. The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence. (2016). Koçkesen, Levent ; Ozdemir, Duygu ; Kokesen, Levent ; Ertac, Seda.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:100:y:2016:i:c:p:24-45.

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  19. The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis. (2016). Wang, Joseph ; Lim, Wooyoung ; Battaglini, Marco.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11356.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11224.

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  21. The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2015). Koçkesen, Levent ; Ozdemir, Duygu ; Kockesen, Levent ; Ertac, Seda.
    In: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
    RePEc:koc:wpaper:1524.

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References

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  1. The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders. (2023). Quement, Mark ; Polanski, Arnold.
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  2. Influencing Social Media Influencers Through Affiliation. (2022). Mayzlin, Dina ; Pei, Amy.
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  3. Strategic information disclosure in vertical markets. (2022). Nicolini, Marcella ; Alderighi, Marco.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
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  4. Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest. (2022). Dilme, Francesc.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  5. Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest. (2022). Dilme, Francesc.
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  6. Designing communication hierarchies. (2021). Migrow, Dimitri.
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  7. Non-competing persuaders. (2020). Wu, Jiemai.
    In: European Economic Review.
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  8. Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk. (2019). Nafziger, Julia ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
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  9. Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources. (2019). Shimizu, Takashi ; Ishida, Junichiro.
    In: Economic Theory.
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  10. Cheap Talk by Two Senders in the Presence of Network Externalities. (2019). Kim, Jeong-Yoo ; Jung, Jeahan.
    In: Korean Economic Review.
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  11. Designing Communication Hierarchies. (2018). Migrow, Dimitri.
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  12. Communication Games with Optional Verification. (2017). Schopohl, Simon.
    In: Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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  13. Communication Games with Optional Verification. (2017). Schopohl, Simon.
    In: Post-Print.
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  14. Communication Games with Optional Verification. (2017). Schopohl, Simon.
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
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  15. Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games. (2017). Lu, Shih En ; En, Shih .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:177-208.

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  16. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
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  17. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Papers.
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  18. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  19. Communication games with optional verification. (2016). Schopohl, Simon.
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  20. An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk. (2015). Wang, Joseph ; Lim, Wooyoung ; Lai, Ernest K..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:114-144.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages. (2014). Miura, Shintaro .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:419-441.

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