An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
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- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2010. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 490-502, March.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 154, Society for Computational Economics.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, 2007. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 315, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," ZEI Working Papers B 30-2002, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," 2004 Meeting Papers 331, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 681, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
References listed on IDEAS
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"An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 490-502, March.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, "undated". "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 237, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 154, Society for Computational Economics.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, 2007. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 315, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," ZEI Working Papers B 30-2002, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," 2004 Meeting Papers 331, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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Citations
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- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002.
"Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating,"
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- Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating," Working Papers 99-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10133, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Tobias Laun, 2020.
"Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health,"
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- Laun, Tobias, 2012. "Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 742, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 26 Mar 2013.
- Tobias Laun, 2012. "Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health," 2012 Meeting Papers 438, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2010.
"An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 490-502, March.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, "undated". "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 237, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 154, Society for Computational Economics.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul, 2004. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," 2004 Meeting Papers 331, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 681, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, 2007. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 315, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," ZEI Working Papers B 30-2002, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
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"Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 108-122.
- David Fuller, 2008. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Quanitative Implications for Unemployment Insurance," 2008 Meeting Papers 889, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- David L. Fuller, 2010. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Quantitative Implications for Unemployment Insurance," Working Papers 12004, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2011.
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- Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot & Sébastien Ménard & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2012. "Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01292095, HAL.
- Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot & Sébastien Ménard & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2012. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00668989, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Unemployment Insurance; Recursive Contracts; Adverse Selection; Repeated Moral Hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DGE-2005-04-03 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-IAS-2005-04-03 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2005-04-03 (Macroeconomics)
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