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A Comment on the "Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking by D. Gill and V. Prowse (2023)"

Author

Listed:
  • Fallucchi, Francesco
  • Marietta Leina, Andrea
  • Silva, Rui
  • Turocy, Theodore L.
Abstract
Gill and Prowse (2023) study response times using a repeated p-beauty contest (p = 0.7). Looking at between-subject variation in response times, they found that subjects who think for longer, on average, win more rounds and choose lower numbers. When comparing average response times and level-k behavior, they observed that higher k types think for longer. In general, we are able to reproduce their findings, despite a minor coding error and some missing information. We test the robustness of their results by comparing average and median response times and choices, separating the sample into quick and slow respondents, including additional controls, and different estimation parameters. We do not find differences between choices between slow and quick respondents, somewhat contradicting their conclusions. Moreover, most subjects played faster as the game was repeated. The remaining results are robust to the inclusion of cohort effects and different parameter specifications in their regressions.

Suggested Citation

  • Fallucchi, Francesco & Marietta Leina, Andrea & Silva, Rui & Turocy, Theodore L., 2024. "A Comment on the "Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking by D. Gill and V. Prowse (2023)"," I4R Discussion Paper Series 170, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:170
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Gill & Victoria Prowse, 2016. "Cognitive Ability, Character Skills, and Learning to Play Equilibrium: A Level-k Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1619-1676.
    2. David Gill & Victoria Prowse, 2023. "Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(650), pages 761-786.
    3. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Debrah Meloso & Luis Miller, 2017. "Strategic risk and response time across games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 511-523, May.
    4. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
    5. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Debrah Meloso & Luis M. Miller, 2008. "Instinctive Response in the Ultimatum Game," ThE Papers 08/08, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    6. Arad, Ayala & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2012. "Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the Colonel Blotto game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 571-585.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    beauty contest; response times; level-k; strategic complexity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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