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The role of public information in corporate social responsibility

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Abstract
Many of the attributes that make a good 'socially responsible' are credence attributes that cannot be learned by consumers either through search or experience. Consumers, then, use for their purchasing decisions 'noisy' information about these attributes obtained from potentially contradictory channels (media, advertisement, NGOs). In this paper we model such informational framework and show the positive relationship between the accuracy of the information transmitted to consumers and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We also show that a firm may be tempted to add noise to the information channel (through lobbying of the media), which might reduce the supply of the CSR attributes and even harm the firm itself (with lower profits). It might then be profitable to the firm to commit ex-ante to not manipulate the information regarding the firm's business practices (e.g., with a partnership with an NGO). Finally, we extend our model to a competition framework endogenizing the number of firms active in the CSR segment. We show both that in more transparent markets a larger number of firms will be CSR, and that in a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given number of CSR firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleix Calveras & Juan José Ganuza, 2015. "The role of public information in corporate social responsibility," Economics Working Papers 1491, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1491
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    1. Aleix Calveras & Juan‐José Ganuza, 2016. "The Role of Public Information in Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 990-1017, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2013. "Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 282-309, February.
    2. Reggiani, Tommaso G. & Rilke, Rainer Michael, 2020. "When Too Good Is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 12905, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Barigozzi, Francesca & Tedeschi, Piero, 2019. "On the credibility of ethical banking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 381-402.
    4. Aleix Calveras & Juan‐José Ganuza, 2018. "Corporate social responsibility and product quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 804-829, October.
    5. Mariusz Zielinski & Izabela Jonek-Kowalska, 2020. "Profitability of Corporate Social Responsibility Activities from the Perspective of Corporate Social Managers," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2), pages 264-280.
    6. Katharina Hombach & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2019. "Shaping Corporate Actions Through Targeted Transparency Regulation: A Framework and Review of Extant Evidence," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 71(2), pages 137-168, May.
    7. Aleix Calveras & Juan‐José Ganuza, 2016. "The Role of Public Information in Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 990-1017, December.
    8. Schinkel, Maarten Pieter & Treuren, Leonard, 2024. "Corporate social responsibility by joint agreement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    9. Kay Bergamini & Piroska Ángel & Vanessa Rugiero & José Ignacio Medina & Katherine Mollenhauer, 2023. "Building Resilient Communities: The Environmental Observatory for Mining Projects and Climate Change Indicators," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(8), pages 1-24, April.
    10. Candel-Sánchez, Francisco & Perote-Peña, Juan, 2024. "How does corporate altruism affect oligopolistic competition?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    11. Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "Environmental regulation under sequential competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 52-72.
    12. You, Linqing & Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2022. "A theory of firm opacity and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    credence good; information asymmetry; corporate social responsibility; regulation; NGO; competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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