Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-09-05 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2014-09-05 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2014-09-05 (Microeconomics)
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