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'Information doesn't want to be free': informational shocks with anonymous online platforms

Author

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  • Amedeo Piolatto

    (Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Barcelona Economics Institute (IEB) and MOVE)

Abstract
Anonymous information platforms (e.g. Airbnb) provide information about experience goods while keeping agents' identity hidden until the transaction is completed. In doing so, they generate heterogeneity in the information levels across consumers. In this paper, I show that such platforms induce a weak increase of offline prices and that only low-valuation goods are cheaper online than offline. Platforms always lead to an increase in profits. In terms of consumer welfare, the platform equilibrium is Pareto superior for low-and high-valuation goods, while for intermediate ranges some buyers benefit while others lose from the presence of the platform.

Suggested Citation

  • Amedeo Piolatto, 2020. "'Information doesn't want to be free': informational shocks with anonymous online platforms," Working Papers 2020/08, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2020-08
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anonymous information platforms; experience goods; mismatch costs; Spokes model; horizontal competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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