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The institutional determinants of Southern secession

Author

Listed:
  • Mario Chacón

    (New York University Abu Dhabi)

  • Jeffrey Jensen

    (New York University Abu Dhabi)

Abstract
We use the Southern secession movement of 1860-1861 to study how elites in democracy enact their preferred policies. Most states used specially convened conventions to determine whether or not to secede from the Union. We argue that although the delegates of these conventions were popularly elected, the electoral rules favored slaveholders. Using an original dataset of representation in each convention, we first demonstrate that slave-intensive districts were systematically overrepresented. Slave-holders were also spatially concentrated and could thereby obtain local pluralities in favor of secession more easily. As a result of these electoral biases, less than 10% of the electorate was sufficient to elect a majority of delegates in four of the six original Confederate states. We also show how delegates representing slave-intensive counties were more likely to support secession. These factors explain the disproportionate influence of slaveholders during the crisis and why secessionists strategically chose conventions over statewide referenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Chacón & Jeffrey Jensen, 2017. "The institutional determinants of Southern secession," Working Papers 2017/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2017-16
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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