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Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability

Author

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  • Gianmarco Daniele

    (University of Barcelona & IEB & Vrije)

Abstract
A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Gianmarco Daniele, 2015. "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability," Working Papers 2015/37, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2015-37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiancai Pi & Pengqing Zhang, 2020. "Organized crime and wage inequality," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(3), pages 344-361, July.
    2. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Immordino, Giovanni & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Self-selecting candidates or compelling voters: How organized crime affects political selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    3. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Immordino, Giovanni & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Mafia wears out women in power: Evidence from italian municipalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 213-236.
    4. Resce, Giuliano, 2022. "The impact of political and non-political officials on the financial management of local governments," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(5), pages 943-962.
    5. Turnbull, Megan, 2021. "When armed groups refuse to carry out election violence: Evidence from Nigeria," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Papagni, Erasmo & Baraldi, Anna Laura & Alfano, Maria Rosaria, 2023. "Ballot structure and political selection. Evidence from changes in electoral rules," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 324-347.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Pinotti, 2019. "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 457-499.
    8. Cavalcanti, Francisco & Daniele, Gianmarco & Galletta, Sergio, 2018. "Popularity shocks and political selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 201-216.
    9. Gianmarco Daniele & Gemma Dipoppa, 2018. "Doing Business Below the Line: Screening, Mafias and Public Funds," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1898, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Caglayan, Mustafa & Flamini, Alessandro & Jahanshahi, Babak, 2021. "Hindering human capital accumulation: A hidden cost of the silent mafia?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 828-845.
    11. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Papagni, 2020. "Do Voters Choose Better Politicians than Political Parties? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Italy," Working Papers 2020.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    12. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Ronza, Carla, 2019. "Organized crime and women in politics: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in southern Italy," MPRA Paper 98473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Makarin, Alexey & Piqué, Ricardo & Aragón, Fernando, 2020. "National or sub-national parties: Does party geographic scope matter?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    14. Campedelli, Gian Maria & Daniele, Gianmarco & Martinangeli, Andrea F.M. & Pinotti, Paolo, 2023. "Organized crime, violence and support for the state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    15. Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Pagani & Marco Stimolo, 2022. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of an Anti-Crime Measure in Fighting Mafia Violence," Working Papers 2022.18, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Resce, Giuliano, 2022. "Political and Non-Political Officials in Local Government," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp22079, University of Molise, Department of Economics.
    17. Di Giorno, Saverio & Dileo, Ivano & Busato, Francesco, 2024. "Shades of grand corruption among allocative efficiency and institutional settings. The case of Italy," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    18. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo & Stimolo, Marco, 2024. "Neutralizing the tentacles of organized crime. Assessment of the impact of an anti-crime measure on mafia violence in Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 57-85.
    19. Gianmarco Daniele & Benny Geys, 2015. "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government dissolutions on electoral outcomes in southern Italian municipalities," Working Papers 2015/41, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    20. Tommaso Giommoni, 2017. "Exposition to Corruption and Political Participation: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 6645, CESifo.
    21. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of an Anti-Crime Measure in Fighting Mafia Violence," FEEM Working Papers 322775, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    22. Antulov-Fantulin, Nino & Lagravinese, Raffaele & Resce, Giuliano, 2021. "Predicting bankruptcy of local government: A machine learning approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 681-699.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political selection; organized crime; politicians’ ability; human capital; spillover effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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