[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/rbnkwp/0417.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Central Bank Mandates and Monetary Policy Stances: through the Lens of Federal Reserve Speeches

Author

Listed:
  • Bertsch, Christoph

    (Research Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Hull, Isaiah

    (Finance Department, BI Norwegian Business School)

  • Lumsdaine, Robin L.

    (Kogod School of Business, American University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute; Center for Financial Stability)

  • Zhang, Xin

    (BIS Innovation Hub Nordic Centre)

Abstract
The Federal Reserve System has an institutional mandate to pursue price stability and maximum sus tainable employment; however, it remains unclear whether it can also pursue secondary objectives. The academic literature has largely argued that it should not. We characterize the Fed’s interpretation of its mandate using state-of-the-art methods from natural language processing, including a collection of large language models (LLMs) that we modify for enhanced performance on central bank texts. We apply these methods and models to a comprehensive corpus of Fed speeches delivered between 1960 and 2022. We find that the Fed perceives financial stability to be the most important policy concern that is not directly enumerated in its mandate, especially in times when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, but does not generally treat it as a separate policy objective. In its policy discourse, it has frequently discussed the use of monetary policy to achieve financial stability, which we demonstrate generates movements in asset prices, even after rigorously controlling for macroeconomic and financial variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertsch, Christoph & Hull, Isaiah & Lumsdaine, Robin L. & Zhang, Xin, 2022. "Central Bank Mandates and Monetary Policy Stances: through the Lens of Federal Reserve Speeches," Working Paper Series 417, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Sep 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0417
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/working-papers/2024/no.-417-central-bank-mandates-and-monetary-policy-stances-through-the-lens-of-federal-reserve-speeches-updated-sept-2024-.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael D Bauer & Carolin E Pflueger & Adi Sunderam, 2024. "Perceptions About Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 139(4), pages 2227-2278.
    2. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May.
    3. Òscar Jordà & Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2017. "Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 213-263.
    4. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180.
    5. N. G. Mankiw, 2009. "The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 5.
    6. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. "Why Are Target Interest Rate Changes So Persistent?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 126-162, October.
    7. Bai, Jushan, 1997. "Estimating Multiple Breaks One at a Time," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 315-352, June.
    8. Francesco Bianchi, 2013. "Regime Switches, Agents' Beliefs, and Post-World War II U.S. Macroeconomic Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 463-490.
    9. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 964-985, September.
    10. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José‐Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2014. "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 463-505, March.
    11. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Alex & Papell, David H. & Prodan, Ruxandra, 2014. "Deviations from rules-based policy and their effects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 4-17.
    12. Apel Mikael & Grimaldi Marianna Blix, 2014. "How Informative Are Central Bank Minutes?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 53-76, April.
    13. Howitt, Peter, 2012. "What have central bankers learned from modern macroeconomic theory?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 11-22.
    14. Boivin, Jean, 2006. "Has U.S. Monetary Policy Changed? Evidence from Drifting Coefficients and Real-Time Data," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(5), pages 1149-1173, August.
    15. Christopher A. Sims & Tao Zha, 2006. "Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 54-81, March.
    16. Anna, Petrenko, 2016. "Мaркування готової продукції як складова частина інформаційного забезпечення маркетингової діяльності підприємств овочепродуктового підкомплексу," Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, vol. 2(1), March.
    17. Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
    18. Adam Hale Shapiro & Daniel J Wilson, 2022. "Taking the Fed at its Word: A New Approach to Estimating Central Bank Objectives using Text Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(5), pages 2768-2805.
    19. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1987. "International Policy Coordination: The Case of the Developing Country Debt Crisis," NBER Working Papers 2287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Tim Loughran & Bill Mcdonald, 2011. "When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 35-65, February.
    21. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kwok Ping Tsang & Zichao Yang, 2023. "Agree to Disagree: Measuring Hidden Dissent in FOMC Meetings," Papers 2308.10131, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baxa, Jaromír & Horváth, Roman & Vašíček, Bořek, 2013. "Time-varying monetary-policy rules and financial stress: Does financial instability matter for monetary policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 117-138.
    2. Knut Are Aastveit & Jamie L. Cross & Francesco Furlanetto & Herman K. Van Dijk, 2024. "Taylor Rules with Endogenous Regimes," Working Papers No 04/2024, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    3. Ahmad, Saad, 2016. "A multiple threshold analysis of the Fed's balancing act during the Great Moderation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 343-358.
    4. Bohl, Martin T. & Kanelis, Dimitrios & Siklos, Pierre L., 2023. "Central bank mandates: How differences can influence the content and tone of central bank communication," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    5. Lakdawala, Aeimit, 2016. "Changes in Federal Reserve preferences," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 124-143.
    6. Knut Are Aastveit & Jamie L. Cross & Francesco Furlanetto & Herman K. Van Dijk, 2024. "Taylor Rules with Endogenous Regimes," Working Papers No 04/2024, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    7. Tachibana, Minoru, 2008. "Inflation zone targeting and the Federal Reserve," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 68-84, March.
    8. Istrefi, Klodiana & Odendahl, Florens & Sestieri, Giulia, 2023. "Fed communication on financial stability concerns and monetary policy decisions: Revelations from speeches," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    9. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Alex & Papell, David H. & Prodan, Ruxandra, 2019. "The Taylor principles," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    10. Givens, Gregory E. & Salemi, Michael K., 2015. "Inferring monetary policy objectives with a partially observed state," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 190-208.
    11. Travaglini, Guido, 2007. "The U.S. Dynamic Taylor Rule With Multiple Breaks, 1984-2001," MPRA Paper 3419, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Jun 2007.
    12. Aguiar-Conraria, Luis & Martins, Manuel M.F. & Soares, Maria Joana, 2018. "Estimating the Taylor rule in the time-frequency domain," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 122-137.
    13. Floro, Danvee & van Roye, Björn, 2017. "Threshold effects of financial stress on monetary policy rules: A panel data analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 599-620.
    14. Castelnuovo, Efrem, 2016. "Modest macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks during the great moderation: An alternative interpretation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB), pages 300-314.
    15. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2014. "Monetary Regime Switches and Central Bank Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(8), pages 1591-1626, December.
    16. Yoosoon Chang & Steven N. Durlauf & Bo Hu & Joon Y. Park, 2024. "Accounting for Individual-Specific Heterogeneity in Intergenerational Income Mobility," Working Papers No 03/2024, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    17. Narek Ohanyan & Aleksandr Grigoryan, 2021. "Measuring monetary policy: rules versus discretion," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 35-60, July.
    18. Leonardo Melosi, 2017. "Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 853-884.
    19. Baxa, Jaromír & Horváth, Roman & Vašíček, Bořek, 2014. "How Does Monetary Policy Change? Evidence On Inflation-Targeting Countries," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 593-630, April.
    20. Nagel, Stefan & Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Yan, Zhen, 2017. "The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC," CEPR Discussion Papers 11902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large Language Models; Machine Learning; Central Bank Communication; Financial Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C55 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Large Data Sets: Modeling and Analysis
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lena Löfgren (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rbgovse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.