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Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Buonanno

    (UniBg - Università degli Studi di Bergamo = University of Bergamo)

  • Ruben Durante

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Giovanni Prarolo
Abstract
Under weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources can increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, ultimately favoring the emergence of mafia-type organizations specialized in such activities. Using a newly collected municipal level dataset, we test this hypothesis by investigating mafia's emergence in XIX century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-right enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulfur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Consistently with this hypothesis, we find robust evidence of significantly higher early mafia activity in municipalities with greater sulfur availability.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo, 2013. "Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Working Papers hal-03460966, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03460966
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Nicola Mastrorocco, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep1018, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource Curse; Weak Institutions; Mafia-type Organizations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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