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Demanding or Deferring? The Economic Value of Communication with Attitude

Author

Listed:
  • Siyu Wang

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Daniel Houser

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

Abstract
This paper investigates why cheap-talk natural language communication is systematically found to promote coordination better than predetermined intention signaling. We hypothesize the reason is that, when communicating with natural language, people both use and respond to intentions and attitudes, where attitude indicates the strength of a message sender’s desire to have her message followed. We test our hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments in both the United States and China. We find (i) free-form messages do include both signaled intentions and attitudes; (ii) people respond both to intentions and attitudes when making decisions; and (iii) the use of attitude significantly improves coordination. Moreover, while males and females recognize and respond to intentions and attitudes equally well, we find females are more likely to send more demanding signals than males, while males send messages focused more on the equilibrium outcome than attitude. Length: 45

Suggested Citation

  • Siyu Wang & Daniel Houser, 2015. "Demanding or Deferring? The Economic Value of Communication with Attitude," Working Papers 1052, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1052
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    File URL: http://www.gmu.edu/schools/chss/economics/icesworkingpapers.gmu.edu/pdf/1052.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. He, Simin & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2019. "The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 238-273.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    communication; coordination; experiment; attitude; gender;
    All these keywords.

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