[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iamodp/91954.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Investment, Credit Constraints And Public Policy In A Neoclassical Adjustment Cost Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Cechura, Lukas
Abstract
This paper deals with the analysis of the impact of credit rationing on the farmer’s economic equilibrium and the analysis of different policy scenarios in a derived neoclassical adjustment cost framework. The theoretical model is an optimal dynamic investment model, in which the upper bound on investment is introduced. The limit of the investment enables to analyse the consequence of the occurrence of credit rationing on farmer’s capital accumulation, investment and supply. The method of optimal control is used to solve the optimization problem. The results show that the occurrence of credit rationing may significantly determine a farmer’s economic equilibrium. Then the analysis of defined policy scenarios suggests that a loan guarantee efficiently solves the problem of the occurrence of external credit rationing. Interest rate subsidy may produce overinvestment and, thus, increases the probability of occurrence of the crowding-out effect, especially in the group of non-credit constraint farmers. Moreover, as far as the cost of agricultural policy is concerned, other agricultural support tools are less effective. The numerical application shows that the farmer’s economic equilibrium is mostly sensitive to the initial bound on investment, the parameter of the cost function, the price, the level of technology and the discount rate. Finally, if the uncertainty is introduced, then the level of investment spending and capital accumulation is lower.

Suggested Citation

  • Cechura, Lukas, 2008. "Investment, Credit Constraints And Public Policy In A Neoclassical Adjustment Cost Framework," IAMO Discussion Papers 91954, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iamodp:91954
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.91954
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/91954/files/dp115.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.91954?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hubbard, R Glenn & Kashyap, Anil K, 1992. "Internal Net Worth and the Investment Process: An Application to U.S. Agriculture," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 506-534, June.
    2. Pindyck, Robert S, 1993. "A Note on Competitive Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 273-277, March.
    3. Blinder, Alan S & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Money, Credit Constraints, and Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 297-302, May.
    4. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    5. Lensink, Robert & Sterken, Elmer, 2000. "Capital Market Imperfections, Uncertainty and Corporate Investment in the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 33(1-2), pages 53-70.
    6. Besley, Timothy, 1994. "How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit Markets?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 9(1), pages 27-47, January.
    7. Karel Janda, 2002. "Model konkurenčního úvěrového trhu v podmínkách nedokonalých informací [A model of a competitive credit market in the conditions of imperfect information]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2002(4).
    8. Blinder, Alan S, 1987. "Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 327-352, June.
    9. Stephen Bond & Julie Ann Elston & Jacques Mairesse & Benoît Mulkay, 2003. "Financial Factors and Investment in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 153-165, February.
    10. Chow, Gregory C., 1997. "Dynamic Economics: Optimization by the Lagrange Method," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195101928.
    11. Steigum, Erling, Jr, 1983. "A Financial Theory of Investment Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(3), pages 637-645, May.
    12. Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
    13. von Kalckreuth, Ulf, 2004. "Financial constraints for investors and the speed of adaptation: Are innovators special?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,20, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    14. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    15. Tybout, James R, 1983. "Credit Rationing and Investment Behavior in a Developing Country," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(4), pages 598-607, November.
    16. Stephen Bond & Costas Meghir, 1994. "Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 197-222.
    17. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    18. Petrick, Martin, 2004. "Credit rationing of Polish farm households: a theoretical and empirical analysis," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 26, number 93022, September.
    19. Catherine Benjamin & Euan Phimister, 2002. "Does Capital Market Structure Affect Farm Investment? A Comparison using French and British Farm-Level Panel Data," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1115-1129.
    20. Robert G. Chambers & Ramon E. Lopez, 1987. "Tax Policies and the Financially Constrained Farm Household," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(2), pages 369-377.
    21. Schworm, William E, 1980. "Financial Constraints and Capital Accumulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(3), pages 643-660, October.
    22. Abel, Andrew B, 1983. "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 228-233, March.
    23. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1997. "Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency," Working Papers (Old Series) 9710, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:zbw:iamodp:91954 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Martin Petrick, 2005. "Empirical measurement of credit rationing in agriculture: a methodological survey," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 33(2), pages 191-203, September.
    3. Wang, Hung-Jen, 2000. "Symmetrical Information and Credit Rationing: Graphical Demonstrations," MPRA Paper 31078, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Feb 2005.
    4. Ann E. Harrison & Inessa Love & Margaret S. McMillan, 2022. "Global capital flows and financing constraints," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Globalization, Firms, and Workers, chapter 8, pages 181-213, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank," Finance 0411027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1987. "Macro-Economic Equilibrium and Credit Rationing," NBER Working Papers 2164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Kislat, Carmen & Menkhoff, Lukas & Neuberger, Doris, 2013. "The use of collateral in formal and informal lending," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79765, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Lines of credit and relationship lending in small firm finance," Proceedings 52, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    9. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    10. Jimenez, Gabriel & Salas, Vicente & Saurina, Jesus, 2006. "Determinants of collateral," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 255-281, August.
    11. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    12. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
    13. Sengupta, Rajdeep, 2007. "Foreign entry and bank competition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 502-528, May.
    14. S. Viswanathan & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Collateral, Financial Intermediation, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity," 2008 Meeting Papers 116, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Zhang, Xuan & Zhang, Yongmin & Scheffel, Eric & Zhao, Yang, 2022. "A key driver for the mixed relationship between loan risk premiums and collateral: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    16. Catherine Fuss & Philip Vermeulen, 2008. "Firms' investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(18), pages 2337-2351.
    17. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    18. Li, Ying & Li, Lingxiao & Zhu, Bing, 2023. "Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277606, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2007. "A lender-based theory of collateral," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 826-859, June.
    20. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
    21. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Jérôme Héricourt & Sandra Poncet, 2007. "FDI and credit constraints: firm level evidence in China," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla07009, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iamodp:91954. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iamoode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.