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Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Hassler, John
  • Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente
  • Storesletten, Kjetil
  • Zilibotti, Fabrizio
Abstract
In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2126
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2000. "The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or Not?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 95-99, May.
    2. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2005. "Heterogeneous labor markets and generosity towards the unemployed: an international perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 88-106, March.
    3. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2003. "The Survival of the Welfare State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 87-112, March.
    4. Di Tella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 2005. "The consequences of labor market flexibility: Panel evidence based on survey data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1225-1259, July.
    5. Assar Lindbeck, 2002. "Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Pension Reform in Europe, pages 19-48, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2002. "Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 481-503, July.
    7. Lindbeck, A. & Wikstrom, S., 1999. "The ICT Revoluation in Consumer Product Markets," Papers 670, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    8. Vodopivec, Milan & Raju, Dhushyanth, 2002. "Income support systems for the unemployed : issues and options," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 25529, The World Bank.
    9. Persson, Mats, 2000. "Five Fallacies in the Social Security Debate," Seminar Papers 686, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    10. Di Tella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 2006. "Europe vs America: Institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(12), pages 2161-2186, December.
    11. Gould, Eric D & Moav, Omer & Weinberg, Bruce A, 2001. "Precautionary Demand for Education, Inequality, and Technological Progress," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 285-315, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparative Advantage; Employment; Political Equilibrium; Search; Specialization; Unemployment Insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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