Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation
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- F. Javier Otamendi & Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2018. "Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-31, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola, 2019.
"An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 289-315.
- Luca Corrazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017. "An Experimental Study on Sequential Auctions with Privately Known Capacities," Working Papers 2017:30, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Mihail Busu & Cristian Busu, 2021. "Detecting Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement. A Cluster Analysis Approach," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Laboratory experiment;JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-02-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2015-02-05 (Experimental Economics)
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