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Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

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  • Banks, Jeffrey S.
  • Sobel, Joel.
Abstract
The authors introduce a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, which refines the set of sequential equilibria in signaling games by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequential equilibria in examples. Divine equilibria exist because a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a stable component. The authors demonstrate through examples that the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller than the set of divine equilibria and present a characterization of the set of stable outcomes in generic signaling games. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:565
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