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Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector: Evidence from School Inspections

Author

Listed:
  • Iftikhar Hussain
Abstract
Performance measurement in the public sector is largely based on objective metrics, which may be subject to gaming behaviour. This paper investigates a novel subjective performance evaluation system where independent inspectors visit schools at very short notice, publicly disclose their findings and sanction schools rated fail. First, I demonstrate that inspection ratings can aid in distinguishing between more and less effective schools, even after controlling for standard observed school characteristics. Second, exploiting a natural experiment, I show that a fail inspection leads to test score gains; at least some of these gains persist in the medium term. I find no evidence to suggest that fail schools are able to inflate test score performance by gaming the system. Oversight by inspectors may play an important role in mitigating such strategic behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Iftikhar Hussain, 2012. "Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector: Evidence from School Inspections," CEE Discussion Papers 0135, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:ceedps:0135
    as

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    File URL: https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cee/ceedp135.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
    2. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Oskari Harjunen & Mika Kortelainen & Tuukka Saarimaa, 2018. "Best Education Money Can Buy? Capitalization of School Quality in Finland," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(2), pages 150-175.
    2. Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2013. "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
    3. Cabrera Hernández, Francisco-Javier, 2016. "Essays on the impact evaluation of education policies in Mexico," Economics PhD Theses 0316, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    4. Sergio Longobardi & Patrizia Falzetti & Margherita Maria Pagliuca, 2018. "Quis custiodet ipsos custodes? How to detect and correct teacher cheating in Italian student data," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 27(3), pages 515-543, August.
    5. Francisco Cabrera-Hernandez, 2015. "Does lengthening the school day increase students’ academic achievement? Evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series 7415, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    subjective performance evaluation; gaming behavior; school inspections.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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