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Ethnic Conflict and the Informational Dividend of Democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti
  • Dominic Rohner
  • Mathias Thoenig
Abstract
Prevailing theories of democracy focus on class conflict. In contrast, we study democratic transition when ethnic tensions are more salient than the poor/rich divide, building a model where (i) ethnic groups negotiate about allocating the economic surplus and (ii) military and political mobilizations rest on the unobserved strength of ethnic attachment. Free and fair elections elicit information and restore inter-ethnic bargaining efficiency. Autocrats can rationally choose democratic transition, even if they risk losing power, as elections reduce the opposition’s informational rent. The predictions of our framework are consistent with novel country-level and ethnic group-level panel correlational evidence on democratization in the post-decolonization period.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig, 2024. "Ethnic Conflict and the Informational Dividend of Democracy," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 73-116.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:22:y:2024:i:1:p:73-116.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvad031
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mathieu Couttenier & Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti & Lore Vandewalle, 2023. "Inequality and Social Unrest in India," IHEID Working Papers 08-2023, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    3. Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig, 2021. "The Elusive Peace Dividend of Development Policy: From War Traps to Macro Complementarities," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 111-131, August.
    4. Federico Maggio & Dominic Rohner & Alessandro Saia, 2024. "The Democracy Dividend: ˗How Early Exposure to Democracy Shapes Health Outcomes˗," CESifo Working Paper Series 11307, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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