Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from Pakistan
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.001
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- Barrera-Osorio,Felipe & Raju,Dhushyanth, 2015. "Teacher performance pay : Experimental evidence from Pakistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7307, The World Bank.
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Citations
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Cited by:- Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Cilliers, Jacobus & Cloutier, Marie-Hélène & Filmer, Deon, 2022.
"Heterogenous teacher effects of two incentive schemes: Evidence from a low-income country,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
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"Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru,"
Working Papers
648, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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- Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta & Christopher Neilson & Marco G. Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú," NBER Working Papers 29068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Christopher A. Neilson & Marco Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú," Working Papers 1273, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Bobba, Matteo & Ederer, Tim & Leon Ciliotta, Gianmarco & Neilson, Christopher A. & Nieddu, Marco, 2021. "Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú," IZA Discussion Papers 14581, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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- Bobba, Matteo & Ederer, Tim & Nieddu, Marco & Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco & Neilson, Christopher, 2021. "Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru," TSE Working Papers 21-1232, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2024.
- Filmer,Deon P. & Habyarimana,James Paul & Sabarwal,Shwetlena, 2020. "Teacher Performance-Based Incentives and Learning Inequality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9382, The World Bank.
- Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Ganimian, Alejandro J., 2016.
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More about this item
Keywords
Performance pay; Incentive pay; Public schools; Teachers; Field experiment; Primary education; Administrative data; Pakistan;
All these keywords.JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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