A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
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DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.009
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- Yi, Jianxin & Wang, Hefei & Li, Yong, 2018. "Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 113-117.
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