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A causality analysis of public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions using regional panel data

Author

Listed:
  • Peng, Wen-Bin
  • Tian, Kun
  • Tian, Yin-Hua
  • Xiang, Guo-Cheng
Abstract
Utilizing the regional data of China covering 29 provinces and municipalities during 1990-2009, this article outlines a systematic approach to investigate the relations between public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions. Results show that government regulation influences environment pollutions while environment pollutions have no influence on government regulation in the short term. Besides, environment pollutions and public participation have no influence on each other. In the long term, there exists the granger causality among public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions. Our results also show that improving the public participation’s ability in environmental protection and strengthening government regulation’s intensity are the basic measures to improve China's environmental pollution in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Peng, Wen-Bin & Tian, Kun & Tian, Yin-Hua & Xiang, Guo-Cheng, 2011. "A causality analysis of public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions using regional panel data," Perspectives of Innovations, Economics and Business (PIEB), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 8(2), pages 1-4, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jrpieb:128649
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.128649
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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