International Journal of Game Theory

We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after ...

A Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses a distribution on nonnegative real numbers with given expectation, so as to maximize the probability that his realized choice is higher than his opponent’s. These games arise in ...

We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent and both players are budget-constrained. We extend the ...

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the ...

In this work we extend a result of Lehrer (Math Oper Res 17(1):175–199, 1992a) characterising the correlated equilibrium payoffs in undiscounted two player repeated games with partial monitoring to the case in which the signals are permitted to be ...

We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite action spaces at each state. When the family of n-stage values $$\{v_n,n\ge 1\}$$ is totally bounded for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the uniform ...

For a broad definition of time-discrete stochastic games, their zero-sum varieties have values. But the existence of $$\epsilon $$-equilibrium for the corresponding non-zero-sum games has proven elusive. We present the problems associated with $$\...

We consider a class of multi-player games with perfect information and deterministic transitions, where each player controls exactly one non-absorbing state, and where rewards are zero for the non-absorbing states. With respect to the average ...

Two standard schemes for awarding a prize have been examined in the literature. The prize is awarded $$(\pi _{D})$$ deterministically: to the contestant with the highest output; $$(\pi _{P})$$ probabilistically: to all contestants, with ...

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic ...

We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the “imitation of success”. In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the standard (...

We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player observes the ...

Bewley and Kohlberg (Math Oper Res 1(3):197–208, 1976) and Mertens and Neyman (Int J Game Theory 10(2):53–66, 1981) have respectively proved the existence of the asymptotic value and the uniform value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state ...

In Aumann (Games Econ Behav 8(1):6–19, 1995, Games Econ Behav 23(1):97–105, 1998), time is assumed implicitly in the description of games of perfect information, and it is part of the epistemic distinction between ex-ante and ex-post knowledge. We ...

We study the links between the values of stochastic games with varying stage duration h, the corresponding Shapley operators $$\mathbf{T}$$ and $$\mathbf{T}_h= h\mathbf{T}+ (1-h ) Id$$ and the solution of the evolution equation $$\dot{f}_t = (\...

We offer a representation result for values of vector measure market games, proving that the value of a game is an “average of marginals”. As a direct result we obtain that the Mertens value is the unique continuous value on the space of vector ...

We show that any non-empty compact semi-algebraic subset of mixed action profiles on a fixed player set can be represented as the projection of the set of equilibria of a game in which additional binary players have been added. Even stronger, we ...

This paper studies the interaction of automata of size m. We characterise statistical properties satisfied by random plays generated by a correlated pair of automata with m states each. We show that in some respect the pair of automata can be ...